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David Hume in “Passive Obedience” writes of a problem with the obliga-
tion to seek justice in all mutual relations concerning humans and human 
institutions.1 The maxim, fiat justitia et ruat cœlom (let justice occur and 
the heavens be razed), would have “pernicious consequences,” if applied in 
extreme instances. When the safety of a nation is at stake, to be constrained 
by justice is to sacrifice “the end to the means”—i.e., lose the nation to win 
justice. Justice, for Hume, is not an end, but a means for human safety and 
wellbeing. Hence, in extraordinary circumstances, justice must be preter-
mitted for self-preservation. Thus, “salus populi suprema lex, the safety of 
the people is the supreme law.”2
Jefferson, like others of his day, was abundantly aware of the problem 
of which Hume writes. Jefferson states that in certain dire circumstanc-
es—e.g., when a person’s life is at stake or when a belligerent nation 
threatens the existence of another—the legal pacts between those per-
sons or nations, and even the laws of morality, are left in abeyancy. 
Survival of the threatened person or nation is the only thing that matters, 
and any actions that conduce to survival are justifiable. Self-preservation 
in such cases trumps all considerations—even moral considerations. The 
right to existence then, seems to be the first axiom of morality, lex su-
prema, for Jefferson in such scenarios. Virtuous living is ancillary. Jef-
ferson, like Hume, seems to be advocating a sort of moral or egoistic 
“survivalism.”
Survivalism for Hume makes sense, for morality for Hume is a matter 
of human sentiment, and the varied human constitutions do not make all 
persons equal and sturdy moralists—hence, the need of justice. To secure 
justice, the employment of reason is needed to enable humans to assess 
utilities, and each person, though not without feelings of benevolence, re-
gards the continuance of his person and his nation with utmost utility.3
1 I would like to thank the journal’s two reviewers, Daniel Walker Howe and Richard Samuelson for aidful 
comments concerning a prior draft of this paper.
2 David Hume, “Of Passive Obedience,” Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (India-
napolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 489. In “Of Justice,” he writes, “The safety of the people is the supreme law: 
All other particular laws are subordinate to it, and dependant on it: And if, in the common course of things, 
they be followed and regarded; it is only because the public safety and interest commonly demand so equal 
and impartial an administration.” David Hume, “Of Justice,” An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Mor-
als, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 29.
3 David Hume, “Concerning Moral Sentiment” and “Some Farther Considerations with regard to Justice,” 
An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1984), 83-8 and 93–98.
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With Jefferson, the moral landscape is different. He is not only a liberal, 
but also an eudemonist of some persuasion,4 as he customarily couples the 
terms liberty and happiness in writings, and the notion of liberty without 
happiness is for him empty. Yet his telos is not dualistic: Liberty is in the 
service of happiness.
For ancient eudemonists like Aristotle and the Stoics, happiness is the 
end of living, and a life without the prospect of happiness, of which virtue 
is the key or sole ingredient, is not worth living. All the goods or conve-
niences of life, without virtue, cannot make a person anything but miser-
able. In sum, virtuous living, not living, is the human telos (the Stoics), 
or the chief part of it (Aristotle). And so, survival without the prospect of 
virtue is valueless.
Is Jefferson a eudemonist or a moral survivalist? Are the two positions 
reconcilable? In this essay, I argue that the difficult passages, mostly of a 
political sort, do not lead to moral survivalism, but are instead consistent 
with the unique eudemonism Jefferson embraced.
The Case for Moral “Survivalism”
In a letter to John Colvin (20 Sept. 1810), Jefferson asks whether circum-
stances do not sometimes require a prudent officer of a nation to go beyond 
the written laws and act rather as circumstances dictate. The question is 
weighty. An affirmative answer allows for the sort pretermission of written 
laws that Federalists of Jefferson’s day thought a strong, capable executive 
should embrace. The question, Jefferson also asserts, requires an affirma-
tive answer.
A code of laws cannot offer an inviolable blueprint for correct politi-
cal action in all scenarios. First, no code of laws anticipates all courses of 
events. Second, there will be times when the correct course of action for 
an officer will be transgression of a written law. Jefferson writes: “A strict 
observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good 
citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, 
of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our 
country by a scrupulous adherence to written law would be to lose the law 
itself, with life, liberty, property, and all those who are enjoying them with 
4 See M. Andrew Holowchak, Dutiful Correspondent: Philosophical Essays on Thomas Jefferson (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 51–68.
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us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.” Thus, if scrupulous 
adherence to written laws which guarantee life, liberty, property, and their 
enjoyment will result, in certain ultraist circumstances, in their riddance, 
then the laws must at least temporarily be pretermitted to save the people.
Jefferson illustrates. “A ship at sea in distress for provisions, meets an-
other having abundance, yet refusing a supply; the law of self-preservation 
authorizes the distressed to take a supply by force. In all these cases, the 
unwritten laws of necessity, of self-preservation, and of the public safety, 
control the written laws of meum and tuum.” In dire circumstances, “mine” 
and “yours” are void.
He then offers a radically different, hypothetical example, set in autumn 
in 1805. What is at stake is a great public boon, provided that the executive 
acts in a timely manner. Suppose that the president—and Jefferson was 
president in 1805—should be offered the Florida territories at a reason-
able price, though one without the appropriation of law, and that Congress 
should meet within three weeks to decide the issue. The advantage to the 
country would be undeniable and considerable, but the risk to the execu-
tive, as a vilipender of laws, would also be considerable.5 Yet Jefferson 
supposes a retardment, which allows for Congress to meet and decide the 
issue. He supposes too that fiery Congressman John Randolph protracts the 
proceedings till the spring to buy time, through a change of circumstances, 
to convince the party other than the president’s not to purchase the terri-
tories. Should he have foreknowledge of the shifty manoeuver, ought the 
president to overpass the laws and make the purchase? Jefferson writes, 
“I think he ought, and that the act would have been approved.” HeJeffer-
son cites the British invasion of the Chesapeake Bay, during his tenure as 
governor of Virginia. “Our magazines were illy provided with some neces-
sary articles, nor had any appropriations been made for their purchase. We 
ventured, however, to provide them, and to place our country in safety; and 
stating the case to Congress, they sanctioned the act.”
Jefferson turns to the case of the Burr conspiracy to overthrow the fledg-
ling American government and General Wilkinson’s situation in New Or-
leans apropos of the conspiracy. Wilkinson expected an attack on New Or-
leans by Burr from the north and by a fleet of British ships from the south. 
5 In the main, Jefferson favored legislative power to executive power, as made evident by his First Inaugural 
Address. See Gerhard Casper, “Executive-Congressional Separation of Power during the Presidency of 
Thomas Jefferson,” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, 476.
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Was Wilkinson justified in essaying to seize the conspirators and to send 
them on trial before the judiciary? Self-preservation dictated that Wilkin-
son, as an officer of the army, overpass the laws and act immediately to 
apprehend the conspirators for the good of the nation.
The danger of their rescue, of their continuing their machinations, the tardiness and 
weakness of the law, apathy of the judges, active patronage of the whole tribe of lawyers, 
unknown disposition of the juries, an hourly expectation of the enemy, salvation of the 
city, and of the Union itself, which would have been convulsed to its centre, had that 
conspiracy succeeded; all these constituted a law of necessity and self-preservation, and 
rendered the salus populi supreme over the written law.
Three points are worth underscoring. First, though Wilkinson clearly 
overstepped the laws, circumstances showed that Wilkinson believed that 
preservation of the union was at risk. Where there is perceived or above-
board risk of loss of the nation, a right-regarding officer is duty-bound 
to place wellbeing of the nation and his fellow citizens, the salus populi, 
above himself and even the laws of the land. Second, those persons judg-
ing the innocence or guilt of the transgressor must do what they can to 
“put themselves [uniquely] into his situation.” They must judge the trans-
gressor by the circumstances in which he was placed and the information, 
true or untrue, by which he acted. If he acted saluti populi,6 he is to be ex-
onerated—perhaps even praised. Three, this scenario differs much from 
that of the possible purchase of the Florida territories, but both involve 
the salus populi.
Jefferson also writes of the salus populi defense concerning the Burr con-
spiracy in letters to William C.C. Claiborne and Dr. James Brown. To Clai-
borne, governor of the Louisiana territory (3 Feb. 1807), Jefferson writes: 
“We judge of the merit of our agents there [at Natchez] by the magnitude of 
the danger as it appeared to them, not as it was known to us. On great occa-
sions, every good officer must be ready to risk himself in going beyond the 
strict line of law, when the public preservation requires it; his motives will 
be a justification as far as there is any discretion in his ultra-legal proceed-
ings, and no indulgence of private feelings.” To Brown (27 Oct. 1808), Jef-
ferson talks of a “set of foreign adventurers, & native mal-contents” in New 
Orleans that would gladly form a separate nation. Acknowledging the law 
6 Saluti, is the dative of salus, so saluti populi is to be read “for the safety of the people.”
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inter arma silent leges,7 Jefferson says, “In an encampment expecting daily 
attack from a powerful enemy, self-preservation is paramount to all law.” 
He then mentions his dismay that the laws are being used by opportunis-
tic Federalists to shield traitors. The traitors ought to be apprehended, not 
shielded. The wellbeing and existence of the nation are at stake. “Should we 
have ever gained our Revolution, if we had bound our hands by manacles 
of the law, not only in the beginning, but in any part of the revolutionary 
conflict? There are extreme cases where the laws become inadequate even 
to their own preservation, and where, the universal resource is a dictator, or 
martial law.”
The argument from self-preservation saluti populi is a message Jefferson 
consistently preached. In a circular letter to Virginia’s county magistrates 
(20 Jan. 1781), Jefferson states, “He is a bad citizen who can entertain a 
doubt whether the law will justify him in saving his country, or who will 
scruple to risk himself in support of the spirit of a law where unavoid-
able accidents have prevented a literal compliance with it.”8 In a report to 
President Washington (18 Mar. 1792), Jefferson writes of a putative treaty 
with Spain for the right to navigate the Mississippi River. He supposes a 
protracted and sanguinary war with England, where the United States relin-
quishes a small parcel of territory in exchange for peace. Such a scenario is 
not straightforwardly applicable to Spain, for the Constitution guarantees 
every state security against invasion and a sanguinary war with Spain might 
yield unexpected results, “as necessity is above all law.”9 In a special mes-
sage to the Senate and House of Representatives (13 Jan. 1806) concern-
ing Tripolitan piracy, Jefferson addresses the actions of American agents 
Commodore Barron and Consul Eaton in forging an alliance with Hamet 
Caramalli, ex-bashaw of Tripoli and elder brother of the current bashaw 
of Tripoli, and the implications of such an alliance. Was the United States 
involved in overthrowing the Tripolitan government? Nothing in the verbal 
instructions of Barron to Eaton involved a stipulation that the United States 
sanctioned Hamet’s overthrow of his brother. Jefferson advocates trust of 
Barron and Eaton:
7 Roughly, “when a country is at war, its laws are silent.”
8 Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Volume II: 1776-1781, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New 
York: P.G. Putnam’s Sons, 1893), 431.
9 Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. III, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery 
Bergh (Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), 170.
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In operations as such a distance, it becomes necessary to leave much to the discretion 
of the agents employed, but events may still turn up beyond the limits of that discretion. 
Unable in such cases to consult his government, a zealous citizen will act as he believes 
that would direct him were it apprized of the circumstances, and will take on himself the 
responsibility. In all these cases the purity and patriotism of the motives should shield 
the agent from blame, and even secure the sanction where the error is not too injurious.
Such American agents, he adds, even if ultimately acting injuriously, ought 
to be exculpated if they acted from “purity and patriotism of … motives.” 
The conjunction, as we shall see, is critical. As agents of America, patrio-
tism is needed. Since public service for Jefferson entails both genius and 
virtue—see, e.g., Jefferson’s letter to John Adams (28 Oct. 1813)—purity 
of intention is needed.
To the governor of Virginia, James Barbour (22 Jan. 1812), Jefferson 
argues against the notion that executive action ought to be stunted, when 
executive counsel is divided or wanting. “It is difficult to suppose it could 
be the intention of those who framed the constitution, that when the council 
should be divided the government should stand still; and the more difficult 
as to a constitution formed during a war, and for the purpose of carrying 
on that war, that so high an officer as their Governor should be created and 
salaried, merely to act as the clerk and authenticator of the votes of the 
council.” One can envision instances where advice cannot be given (e.g., 
absence or sickness or advisors) or is unavailing (e.g., division among advi-
sors or dissatisfactory counsel). Is the executive to be an inactive spectator, 
who allows the government to “tumble to pieces for want of a will to direct 
it”? Jefferson adds: “In executive cases, where promptitude and decision 
are all important, an adherence to the letter of a law against its probable 
intentions … would be fraught with incalculable danger.” When the state 
is invaded and the legislature, convened, is divided on appropriate action, 
“can it be believed to have been the intention of the framers of the consti-
tution, that the constitution itself and their constituents with it should be 
destroyed for want of a will to direct the resources they had provided for its 
preservation?”
In such dire instances, “construction must be made secundum arbitrium 
boni viri10 and the constitution be rendered a practicable thing.” Boni viri 
here is not mere political rhetoric, but plainly has moral intent. Analogy 
10 “Following the umpirage of a good man.”
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with the judiciary is unaidful. “They act ever on an individual case only, 
the evil of which is partial, and gives time for correction. But an instant of 
delay in executive proceedings may be fatal to the whole nation. They must 
not, therefore, be laced up in the rules of the judiciary department.” The ex-
ecutive must be amenable to seek out, assimilate, and conform to counsel, 
but he must not be stockstill when counsel is gridlocked or unavailable. It 
is the same when an individual’s life is threatened. “There are situations 
when form must be dispensed with,” Jefferson tells William Short (24 Nov. 
1791). “A man attacked by assassins will call for help to those nearest him, 
and will not think himself bound to silence till a magistrate may come to 
his aid.”
In his “Autobiography,” Jefferson even endorses some mechanism of 
removal of judges, whose biased decisions threaten the confederation of 
states. “Honest error must be arrested where it’s toleration leads to public 
ruin. As, for the safety of society, we commit honest maniacs to Bedlam, so 
judges should be withdrawn from their bench, whose erroneous biases are 
leading us to dissolution. It may indeed injure them in fame or in fortune; 
but it saves the republic, which is the first and supreme law.” That is not to 
invoke a consolidation of powers, for there is good government only when, 
by a “partition of cares, descending in gradation from general to particular 
[i.e., from state to counties to wards to individual farms], the mass of hu-
man affairs [is] best managed for the good and prosperity of all.”11
The issue of vilipending moral obligations between nations occurs also 
in “Opinion on the French Treaties” (28 Apr. 1793). Jefferson advises Presi-
dent Washington on whether treaties with France are still binding, given 
France’s recent movement from a monarchy to a declared republic. The 
people of a nation, Jefferson begins, are the voice of that nation. Therefore, 
the treaties between France and the United States are between the peoples 
of each nation. Given that each nation still exists, though both have “since 
changed their forms of government,” the treaties are not annulled. He says 
that there are three branches of the “Law of nations”: the moral law, the us-
ages of nations, and the special conventions of nations. Of those, only the 
moral law is relevant.
The Moral duties which exist between individual and individual in a state of nature, ac-
company them into a state of society & the aggregate of the duties of all the individuals 
11 See also Jefferson’s Seventh Annual Message (1807).
11EUDEMONISM OR SURVIVALISM?
composing the society constitutes the duties of that society towards any other; so that 
between society & society the same moral duties exist as did between the individuals 
composing them while in an unassociated state, their maker not having released them 
from those duties on their forming themselves into a nation. Compacts then between na-
tion & nation are obligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to 
observe their compacts.12
Thus, the question is moral, not political. “Questions of natural right are tri-
able by their conformity with the moral sense & reason of man. Those who 
write treatises of natural law, can only declare what their own moral sense 
& reason dictate in the several cases they state.”13
Because the principle of morality exists in the heart of every honest 
and rational man, Jefferson, following Vattel, says, “[a person] will never 
read there the permission to annul his obligations for a time, or for ever, 
whenever they become ‘dangerous, useless, or disagreeable.’” Nonethe-
less, there are dire times, as we have seen, when the moral duties between 
persons are exempted. Likewise there are dire times when the moral du-
ties between nations are exempted. Jefferson continues, in a manner that 
suggests a homomorphic relationship between moral duties between indi-
viduals and nations: “There are circumstances however which sometimes 
excuse the non-performance of contracts between man & man: so are there 
also between nation & nation. When performance, for instance, becomes 
impossible, non-performance is not immoral. So if performance becomes 
self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws 
of obligation to others.”14
Jefferson especially has in mind scenarios in which what is at risk is the 
life of a person or the existence of a nation.15 If, for illustration, someone 
non compos mentis16 threatens to kill another, the person threatened has no 
duty to treat the deranged person with benevolence. Likewise, if an aggres-
12 Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: The Library of America, 1984), 423.
13 Thomas Jefferson, Writings, 428.
14 Thomas Jefferson, Writings, 423–24.
15 Thomas Jefferson, “Answers to Démeunier’s First Queries,” 24 Jan. 1786. In less dire circumstances, 
such as when one state threatens secession from the nation, the other states have a “natural right” to force 
the compliance of the maverick state to the will of the majority of states. That, however, is not to say the 
maverick state has no right to secede. The secession of any one state, Steele shows in his excellent paper, 
does much to destabilize the union of the remaining states. For more, see Brian Steele, “Thomas Jefferson, 
Coercion, and the Limits of Harmonious Union,” The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 74, No. 4, 2008, 
823–54.
16 “Of unsound mind.”
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sive nation threatens to invade another nation and exterminate it, the threat-
ened nation has no duty to treat the aggressive nation with benevolence. 
Here the language starkly suggests abeyancy of moral conduct—a tempo-
rary state of amorality. Anything, it seems, goes to preserve personhood or 
nationhood.17 As Reginald Stuart says, “Jefferson held both his intellectual 
convictions and moral sympathies well in check when it came to the sur-
vival of his country.”18 He adds later: “Jefferson, although deeply commit-
ted to liberal and moral principles, saw war as an act for the protection and 
survival of the state. He would no more contemplate an international cru-
sade for republicanism than he would agree to war unless the circumstances 
were unequivocal and compelling.”19
All such dire circumstances, pace Vattel, involve danger, but not useless-
ness or disagreeableness.20 Danger is illustrated by three scenarios. First, the 
danger which absolves a nation must be “great, inevitable, & imminent.”21 
The lengthy elaboration which follows makes it clear that the conjunction 
of terms is crucial. Failure of magnitude, inevitability, or imminence is suf-
ficient grounds for maintaining moral duties. Second, there can be “great & 
inevitable danger” that is the result of a treaty.22 Third, circumstances can 
make compliance impossible and dangerous.23 Yet if non-compliance oc-
curs without just cause or without compensation, there are grounds for war.
Life versus the Good Life
The scenarios examined above strongly intimate abeyancy of morality—
viz., that there are dire times when the laws and moral relations between 
persons and nations must be temporarily shelved. That seems in confor-
mance with the Zeitgeist of Jefferson’s day. Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan 
maintained that “to seek peace and follow it” was the fundamental law of 
17 Such passages are manifestly at odds with Jesus’s teachings, though Jefferson never claimed to follow 
Jesus all the way. E.g., Jefferson writes to Short, “[Jesus] preaches the efficacy of repentance towards 
forgiveness of sin; I require a counterpoise of good works to redeem it.” TJ to William Short, 4 Aug. 1820.
18 Reginald C. Stuart, “Thomas Jefferson and the Function of War: Policy or Principle?” Annales Cana-
diennes d’histoire, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1976, 162.
19 Reginald C. Stuart, “Thomas Jefferson and the Function of War,” 170.
20 To concede uselessness or disagreeableness is to make a concession “in opposition to the morality of every 
honest man.” Thomas Jefferson, Writings, 428.
21 Thomas Jefferson, Writings, 424.
22 Thomas Jefferson, Writings, 427.
23 Thomas Jefferson, Writings, 427.
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nature, but the second law, “by all means we can, to defend ourselves,” each 
had too by right of nature.24 “The office of the sovereign be it a monarch 
or an assembly, consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the 
sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people.; to 
which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof 
to God.”25 John Locke states that a man’s first power in the state of nature 
is “to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and oth-
ers within the permission of the law of nature.”26 The motto, Salus populi 
suprema Lex esto, is the epigram to his Two Treatises of Government. So it 
is not untoward that Jefferson should view self-survival as a principal that 
trumps all moral considerations in dire circumstances—viz., that is the axial 
principal of morality (salus populi suprema lex).
An immediate imbroglio is the significant influence of ancient virtue-eth-
ics thinking on Jefferson as well as all moral-sense philosophers of his day. 
Jefferson, I have elsewhere shown, is a eudemonist of some persuasion,27 
and for eudemonists, like Aristotle and the Stoics, it is not any life that 
is worth living, but only a virtuous life. Jefferson, in his “Opinion on the 
French Treaties” especially, is clear that self-preservation trumps duties to 
others, and that seems inconsistent with ancient eudemonism. For ancient 
eudemonists, self-preservation in dire circumstances is not morally neutral. 
Furthermore, for ancient eudemonists, self-preservation neither trumps all 
considerations of morality nor can it be taken as the first axiom of morality.
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics catalogs three goods—goods of soul, 
of body, and of chance—all of which are needed for happiness (Gr., eu-
daimonia). Goods of soul—e.g., generosity, friendliness, magnanimity, 
justice, courage, and irascibility, etc.—are illustrative of virtue (Gr., aretē) 
or an even, settled disposition of soul. Goods of body—e.g., health and 
good looks—are illustrative of a settled, humoral disposition of body. Ex-
ternal goods—e.g., wealth and fame—are dictated by chance and not up to 
persons. One perfectly happy has the right admixture of the three sorts of 
goods. He is fully virtuous—viz., he has a full amount of each of the par-
24 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1962), 104.
25 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 247.
26 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Com-
pany, 1980), §128. See also §6.
27 The moral behavior for Jefferson is, of course, not rationally directed as it is for Aristotle and the Stoics. 
See M. Andrew Holowchak, Dutiful Correspondent: Philosophical Essays on Thomas Jefferson (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 51–68.
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ticular virtues—and possesses a full complement, though a lesser degree, 
of bodily and external goods. Though all three are labeled “goods” and are 
deemed needed, the virtues are preeminent goods. One in full possession 
of virtue will never be miserable; one lacking virtue will be miserable ir-
respective of full possession of bodily and external goods.28
For the Stoics, in contrast, virtue is the sole good and it is deemed suf-
ficient for happiness. The particular virtues have a value that is fixed and 
absolute. Other things—such as health, wealth, and even life—are valuable 
and choice-worthy, but not goods. “We deem nothing as good that someone 
can put to wrong use,” writes Seneca,29 and health, wealth, and even life 
can be put to wrong use. Antoninus makes the point more bluntly, “Ask 
yourself whether we should accept as goods—and should value—the things 
… whose abundance leaves their owner with ‘no place to shit.’”30 Such 
things are “conveniences” (Gr., proegmena, L. commoda) and their value 
is unfixed and relative. One in full possession of virtue is happy; one lack-
ing full possession of virtue, even one close to full possession of virtue, is 
miserable.
For both Aristotle and the Stoics it is not life that is worth living or pre-
serving, but only a virtuous life. One without full possession of virtue will 
always be miserable. It is only virtue, or the prospect of attaining it, that 
gives live worth. The Stoics, Cicero tells us, go so far as to advocate sui-
cide, when the prospect for virtuous living is minified.31 What is applicable 
to persons is applicable straightforwardly to states (poleis). A state without 
virtue is a miserable state, and so it is not any state that is worth having, but 
a virtuous state.32
Jefferson agrees. His experiment with republican government does not 
merely aim at political expediency, but also at moral advance. In his “First 
Inaugural Address” (4 Mar. 1801), Jefferson states limns numerous moral 
principles of republicanism, among them: equal and exact justice to all men; 
peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations; the preservation 
of the federal government as “the sheet anchor of our peace at home and 
28 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 
I.8–10.
29 Seneca, Epistles, CXX.3
30 Aurelius, Meditations, trans. Gregory Hays (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), V.12.
31 Cicero, De finibus, III.60-1.
32 E.g., see Aristotle, Politics, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 
1324a5-7.
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safety abroad”; election by the people; acquiescence to the will of the ma-
jority; supremacy of the civil over the military authority; honest and timely 
payment of our debts; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as 
its handmaid; the diffusion of information; and freedom of religion, of the 
press, and of person. The address is not rhetoric. Consistent with the mes-
sage of numerous other writings, Jefferson’s political principles are norma-
tively grounded. Liberty for Jefferson is in service to human happiness or 
thriving.
As with Aristotle and the Stoics, virtuous governing and a morally sen-
sitive citizenry are needed. Virtuous governing occurs by instantiating a 
system of government that allows for rule by the most intelligent and most 
virtuous—i.e., the “natural aristoi.” He writes to John Adams (28 Oct. 
1813), “The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of na-
ture for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. … May we 
not even say that that form of government is the best which provides the 
most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices 
of government?” Nothing is needed for a morally sensitive citizenry other 
than liberty and general education. “State a moral case to a plowman & a 
professor,” Jefferson says to nephew Peter Carr (10 Aug. 1787), “the for-
mer will decide it as well and often better than the latter, because he has not 
been led astray by artificial rules.” A state in neglect of the happiness of its 
citizenry is morally degenerate. For illustration, as president, Jefferson’s 
advocacy of the purchase of the Louisiana territories and his use of em-
bargo as a political response to the British attack on the U.S.S. Chesapeake 
on June 22, 1807, had moral sanction.33
However, Jefferson’s argument from self-preservation seems to be pos-
iting that the preservation of a nation or of a man trumps all regard for 
principles—written laws, established by convention, as well as moral du-
ties, inscribed in the heart of each person. For instance, at times when the 
existence of the state is in question, moral considerations can be deferred 
for the sake of self-preservation. In such scenarios, anything goes. Put oth-
erwise, the first principle of morality is the right to neglect morality when 
existence is threatened. Other moral principles, even virtuous existence, are 
subordinate. That means that preservation of life, irrespective of its moral-
ity or non-morality, is the chief moral good. Life is the first axiom of moral-
33 A point that does not go unnoticed by Peterson. Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson & the New Nation: 
A Biography (Oxford University Press, 1970), 885–86.
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ity; living well is a secondary consideration. If so, Jefferson here is a sort 
of moral or egoistic “survivalist.” That is inconsistent with eudemonism.
The Foundation and Nature of Morality
There is, however, a difficulty in dubbing Jefferson a moral survivalist. The 
basal egoism it presumes is inconsistent with Jefferson’s moral sense.
In a letter to Thomas Law (13 June 1814), Jefferson examines several 
theories, self-love among them, apropos of the foundation of morality. Self-
interest or egoism cannot be the foundation of morality, concludes Jeffer-
son, for “I consider our relations with others as constituting the boundaries 
of morality. … To ourselves, in strict language, we can owe no duties, obli-
gation requiring also two parties.” It is not just that self-love is not a part of 
morality, but also that “it is its exact counterpart”—viz., “the sole antagonist 
of virtue.” Self-interest causes neglect of moral duties to others.
To Benjamin Rush over 10 years earlier (21 Apr. 1803), Jefferson makes 
good on a promise years ago to expand on his views of Christianity. Having 
read and mulled over Joseph Priestley’s “Socrates and Jesus Compared,” Jef-
ferson drafts his “Syllabus of an Estimate of the Merit of the Doctrines of 
Jesus, Compared with Those of Others.” When he comes to the contribution 
of ancient moralists—and he lists Pythagoras, Socrates, Epicurus, Cicero, 
Epictetus, Seneca, and Antoninus—he asserts that they do well in prescribing 
precepts, applicable to governing bestial passions and procuring tranquility 
of mind, but were “short and defective” concerning duties to others. “They 
embraced … the circles of kindred & friends, and inculcated patriotism, or 
the love of our country in the aggregate, as a primary obligation: toward our 
neighbors & countrymen they taught justice, but scarcely viewed them as 
within the circle of benevolence. Still less have they inculcated peace, charity 
& love to our fellow men, or embraced with benevolence the whole family 
of mankind.” Jesus corrected the defects of the ancient moralists. He preach 
universal benevolence—i.e., “he pushed his scrutinies into the heart of man; 
erected his tribunal in the region of his thoughts, and purified the waters at the 
fountain head.” In short, Jesus factored in intendment.
These letters, where Jefferson comes as clean as he can come on the na-
ture of morality, show that morality comprises duties to men (and to deity), 
not duties to self. The letter to Law shows that duty for Jefferson is dyadic, 
never monadic. The letter to Rush shows that the chief defect of ancient 
moralists is that they displace the base of morality. Their accounts are not 
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duty-driven. For such ancients, actions involving others are substratally 
egoistical.
Nonetheless, his “Syllabus” his letter to Law strongly suggest that Jef-
ferson was not moral survivalist—that the right to life cannot be the first 
principle of morality—for self-preservation is a species of self-interest and 
morality is nowise concerned with self-interest. Morality entails duty, and 
duty is dyadic. It essentially involves other persons (and deity).
Still, as we have seen, Jefferson thought self-preservation of crucial im-
portance in dire straights—e.g., “if performance becomes self-destructive 
to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation to 
others.” In certain scenarios, such as when one’s life is unfairly jeopardized 
by a thug, one is entitled to use singular means to protect oneself from the 
thug. Yet one certainly would not want to say that the person threatened 
is using immoral actions by protecting himself—that his actions are “self-
ish”—even if he kills the thug. Selfishness is not the issue. Everyone has a 
right to be “selfish” in such scenarios. The selfishness to which Jefferson 
objects in his letter to Law is “self-gratification in violation of our moral 
duties to others.” Protecting oneself from unwarranted harm by parrying 
off a thug and perhaps even killing him in the process is not self-gratifying 
action at expense of fulfillment of duties to others. What is applicable to in-
dividuals is applicable to states. No state is “selfish” for essaying to protect 
itself against another state, intent at all costs on belligerency.
In dire circumstances, self-preservation for Jefferson is not selfish, but 
self-regarding, as the normal duties between men or nations are in abey-
ancy. Nevertheless, such scenarios are not monadic, but dyadic, and so mo-
rality is not inappropos. Regard for morality requires protective measures. 
Such actions are not amoral.
Fiat Justitia et Ruat Coelum: The Case for Eudemonism
Jefferson did not value life as the first axiom of ethics. His apologia for self-
preservation of nations is not only consistent with ancient eudemonism, but 
also derived from consideration that it is not any political unit that is worth 
preserving, but only one with due regard for the wellbeing of its citizenry. 
Thus, the scenarios which Jefferson dubbed self-preservative are not excep-
tions to moral action, instances where morally correct action is prorogued, 
or instances of amoral action. They are bona fide instances of agents or 
nations acting with due regard for morality—i.e., in keeping with ancient 
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eudemonism. So, self-preservation is not the issue for Jefferson, but self-
preservation saluti populi.
In A Summary View of the Rights of British America, Jefferson speaks 
of “many unwarrantable encroachments and usurpations” on the god-giv-
en rights of British Americans. He limns numerous acts passed by Parlia-
ment that can only have the intent of reducing British Americans to slavery. 
“Single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of a day; 
but a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period, and pursued 
unalterably through every change of ministers, too plainly prove a deliber-
ate and systematic plan of reducing us to slavery.”34 The king is, after all, 
nothing more than “the chief officer of the people, appointed by the laws, 
and circumscribed with definite powers, to assist in working the great ma-
chine of government, erected for their use, and consequently subject to their 
superintendence.”35 He sums, “The God who gave us life gave us liberty at 
the same time; the hand of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them.”36 
This final declaration is critical. It is not any life that is worth preserving, 
but only one, in keeping with the nature of man, that is free. The linkage of 
life with liberty is correct, but misleading. There is here only a loose sort of 
normativity. More needs to be said to secure normativity.
Happiness—the predominant ingredient of which is virtue for Jefferson—
is missing. Happiness is the true end of human living, and liberty, often ad-
joined to happiness in Jefferson’s writings, is subordinate to it. To, he asserts, 
“The freedom and happiness of man … [are] the sole objects of all legitimate 
government.” To Thomas Cooper (29 Nov. 1802), Jefferson links happiness 
with negative liberty. “A noiseless course, not meddling with the affairs of 
others, unattractive of notice, is a mark that society is going on in happiness. 
If we can prevent the government from wasting the labors of the people, un-
der the pretence of taking care of them, they must become happy.”37 Again, 
happiness and liberty through governmental non-intervention Jefferson ap-
plies to commerce between nations in a report in 1793.38
34 Thomas Jefferson, Summary View, Writings, 110.
35 Thomas Jefferson, Summary View, Writings, 105.
36 Thomas Jefferson, Summary View, Writings, 122.
37 See also TJ to Jean Baptiste Ternant, 23 Feb. 1793; TJ to Madame de Lafayette, 16 Mar. 1793; TJ to Joseph 
Priestley, 29 Nov. 1802; TJ to Gen. Thaddeus Kościusko, 26 Feb. 1810; TJ to A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy, 26 
Jan. 1811; TJ to George Tincknor, 25 Nov. 1817; TJ to Samuel Adams Wells, 12 May 1819; and TJ to Judge 
Spencer Roane, 6 Sept. 1819.
38 Thomas Jefferson, “Report on the Privileges and Restrictions of the Commerce of the United States in 
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The Declaration of Independence is perhaps Jefferson’s plainest expres-
sion of the insufficiency of the coupling of life and liberty. Happiness is 
needed. Writes Gilbert Chinard, “I do not believe that any other State paper 
in any nation had ever proclaimed so emphatically and with such finality 
that one of the essential functions of government is to make man happy, or 
that one of his essential natural rights is ‘the pursuit of happiness.’”39 Yet 
Chinard understates the issue by failing to note that happiness is the sole 
end of human action—the true first axiom of morality, given that men are 
axially social creatures.
The Declaration begins by listing several self-evident truths: all men are 
created equal, all men are endowed by deity with certain inalienable rights 
(life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), governments derive their pow-
ers from the consent of the governed, governments are instituted to secure 
citizens’ rights, and whewn government does not preserve citizens’ rights, 
citizens have a right to “alter or abolish” their government and to institute 
a new one on “such principles, & organizing it’s powers in such for, as to 
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety & happiness.”
Expatiating on the final truth—the right to revolution, whether mild or 
wholesale—he maintains that, in cases of governmental abuse, it is pru-
dent to suffer “while evils are sufferable,” but action must be taken when 
the evils are significant of despotism—when happiness is burked. “When 
a long train of abuses & usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, 
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, 
it is their duty to throw off such government, & to provide new guards for 
their future security.”40 The sentiment is in keeping with the triad of dan-
gers—great, inevitable, and imminent—in “Opinion on the French Trea-
ties.” It is not any form of government that citizens have a right to over-
throw, but merely a dangerously oppressive government, which disallows 
human happiness. Thus, it is not any form of government that is worth 
having, but merely virtuous government. Jefferson writes at the end of the 
Declaration, “For the support of this declaration we mutually pledge to each 
other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour.”41 Consequently, for 
Foreign Countries,” Writings, 435–48.
39 Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson: The Apostle of Americanism (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michi-
gan Press, [1929] 1962), 75.
40 Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, Writings, 19.
41 Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, Writings, 24.
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Jefferson, life cannot be the first axiom of morality, for it is not any life that 
is worth defending, but only that life that promises human happiness. Jef-
ferson is no moral survivalist.
The “Principles” of Moral Activity
Jefferson, we have seen, often writes of self-preservation as a principle that 
trumps all principles of written law or moral activity. The intimation is that 
self-preservation or the right to life is the first axiom of morality.
Yet such passages show that self-preservation is not the issue, but self-
preservation in certain, dire scenarios—viz., self-preservation saluti po-
puli. It is not every life or every nation that is worth preserving at any cost. 
Consonant with ancient eudemonism, it is only the existence of a virtue-
embracing person or virtue-embracing nation that is worth defending at 
any cost. As Julian Boyd argues, Jefferson’s “uncompromising devotion” 
to the confederation of states was not due to a sense of nationalism, but 
because of “its identity with human rights”—viz., it was a virtue-embrac-
ing confederation. When a villainous person or nation severely derogates 
the happiness of a virtue-abiding person or nation, the person or nation 
threatened has a right, and even a moral duty, to protect oneself or itself, 
and defend the right to pursue a happy existence. Thus, abeyancy of laws 
and moral duties in dire scenarios is not a temporary state of amoral-
ity. It is instead a temporary state of abeyancy of the normal, mutually 
beneficent moral relations that ought to obtain between nations. Such a 
state of abeyancy is not abeyancy of action, but instantiation of another, 
more substratal code of moral actions on behalf of the virtue-abiding na-
tion, threatened with dissolution. Dire circumstances demand dire actions 
on the part of a virtue-abiding person or state. No virtue-abiding person 
or nation is morally required to respond to malevolent actions with be-
neficence. Here Jefferson parts sharply with the Jesus’s morality, which, 
stripped of its corruptions, he says to Benjamin Rush (21 Apr. 1803) is 
“the most perfect and sublime that has ever been taught by man.” As Jef-
ferson writes to William Short (4 Aug. 1820), “[Jesus] preaches the ef-
ficacy of repentance towards forgiveness of sin; I require a counterpoise 
of good works to redeem it.”
Merrill Peterson roughly captures the sentiment of self-preservation sa-
luti populi when he states that “the moral right [for Jefferson] precedes the 
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legal guarantee.”42 I add “roughly,” because for Jefferson, like Aristotle and 
the Stoics, there are no formalizable and inviolable principles of morality. 
Were that the case, morality would be beholden to rationality, not to the 
moral sense, which operates independently of rationality and formulates au 
pied levé its moral judgments in scenarios. Jefferson writes, for instance, 
to nephew Peter Carr (10 Aug. 1787), “He who made us would have been 
a pitiful bungler if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of 
science.”43 Rules are, in the main, rough guides for youths and initiates.44
The scenario is similar for the ancient Stoics, whom Jefferson read thor-
oughly and whose teachings Jefferson integrated into his life. The Roman 
Stoic Seneca limns praecepta and decreta—that is, specific rules (precepts) 
and basic principles (doctrines) of right conduct. Precepts, grounded in doc-
trines, are rough guides to action in specific scenarios. Doctrines are service-
able, but not indefeasible guides of action. Writes Seneca: “Virtue depends 
partly on instruction and partly on practice. You must learn first and then 
strengthen your learning by action. If this is true, not only do the doctrines 
of wisdom help us, but so do the precepts, which check and banish our emo-
tions by a sort of official decree.”45 Seneca here, like Jefferson, is directing 
his statements to youths. The difference, however, is that right action for the 
Stoics had the sanction of reason, which is not the case for Jefferson.
Because precepts and doctrines were defeasible guides of action, the Sto-
ics referred often to moral exemplars, like Socrates or Zeno, the founder of 
Stoicism, to guide those persons aspiring to virtue. Writes Epictetus:
42 Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson & the New Nation: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1970), 94.
43 See also TJ to Maria Cosway, 12 Oct. 1786; TJ to James Fishback, 27 September 1809, and TJ to Thomas 
Law, 13 June 1814. Nonetheless, Jefferson does sometimes write of general rules of right conduct—he 
has a predilection for speaking of “moral principles” (e.g., TJ to Benjamin Rush, 21 Apr. 1803; TJ to John 
Adams, 12 Oct. 1813; TJ to P.S. Dupont de Nemours, 24 Apr. 1816; and TJ to Mathew Carey, 11 Nov. 
1816)—but rule-following, all in all, is unavailing.
44 That is why Jefferson advises the young to read history and morally uplifting fiction. For adults, because 
of the complexity of real-life situations, moral principles are in the main unavailing. The moral sense, fully 
nurtured and strengthened by the exercise of experience, dictates morally correct action in mature persons. 
See TJ to Robert Skipwith, 3 Aug. 1771; TJ to James Madison, 20 Feb. 1784; TJ to Ebenezer Hazard, 18 
Feb. 1791; TJ to John Norvell, 14 June 1807; TJ to Anne Randolph Bankhead, 8 Dec. 1808; TJ to Col. Wil-
liam Duane, 1810; TJ to Col. William Duane, 4 Apr. 1813; TJ to William Wirt, 1814; TJ to John Adams, 10 
Aug. 1815; TJ to William Wirt, 12 Nov. 1816; TJ to John Adams, 5 May 1817; and TJ to William Short, 8 
Jan. 1825.
45 My translation. Seneca, Epistles, Vol. III, trans. Richard M. Gummere (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, [1925] 2000), XCIV.47.
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Take Socrates and observe a man who had a wife and children, but regarded them not as 
his own, who had a country—as far as it was his duty and in the way in which it was his 
duty—friends, and kinsmen—one and all subject to the law and to obedience to the law. 
That is why, when it was his duty to serve as a soldier, he was the first to leave home. That 
is why he ran the risks of battle most ungrudgingly…. When he had to speak in defense 
of his life, he did not behave as one who had children or wife, did he? No, he spoke as 
one who was alone in the world. Yes, and when he had to drink the poison, how did he 
act? … He did not care, he says, to save his paltry body, but only what is increased and 
preserved by justice and what is decreased and destroyed by injustice…. It is impossible 
to save such a man by dishonor, but he is saved by death, not by fleeing from prison.46
Jefferson too relied on moral exemplars like William Small, George Wythe, 
and Peyton Randolph in his own upbringing. To grandson Thomas Jef-
ferson Randolph (24 Nov. 1808), Jefferson writes, in a moving passage 
reminiscent of Hercules’s choice between Virtue and Pleasure in Greek 
mythology,47 of two paths which he, at a kairotic moment at the age of 14, 
faced.
I had the good fortune to become acquainted very early with some characters of very high 
standing, and to feel the incessant wish that I could ever become what they were. Under 
temptations and difficulties, I would ask myself what would Dr. Small, Mr. Wythe, Pey-
ton Randolph do in this situation? What course in it will insure me their approbation? I 
am certain that this mode of deciding on my conduct, tended more to correctness than any 
reasoning powers I possessed. Knowing the even and dignified line they pursued, I could 
never doubt for a moment which of two courses would be in character for them. Whereas, 
seeking the same object through a process of moral reasoning, and with the jaundiced 
eye of youth, I should often have erred. From the circumstances of my position, I was 
often thrown into the society of horse racers, card players, fox hunters, scientific and 
professional men, and of dignified men; and many a time have I asked myself, in the 
enthusiastic moment of the death of a fox, the victory of a favorite horse, the issue of a 
question eloquently argued at the bar, or in the great council of the nation, well, which of 
these kinds of reputation should I prefer? That of a horse jockey? a fox hunter? an orator? 
or the honest advocate of my country’s rights? Be assured, my dear Jefferson, that these 
little returns into ourselves, this self-catechising habit, is not trifling nor useless, but leads 
to the prudent selection and steady pursuits of what is right.48
46 Epictetus, Discourses, IV.i.159-65. See also III.14-8, II.5-6, II.14-6, and II.22-3, and Aurelius’s Medita-
tions, VII.66. 
47 Heracles faced the choice between two goddesses—Hēdonē, a life of ease and pleasure, and Aretē, a life 
of hardship and toil, but one dear to the gods. He chose the latter. Xenophon, Memorabilia, E.G. Marchant 
and O.J. Todd (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923), § II.ii.21-34.
48 See also TJ to John Saunderson, 31 Aug. 1820; TJ to Isaac Engelbrecht, 25 Feb. 1824; and Thomas Jef-
ferson, “Autobiography,” Writings, 4–5.
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The passage, gravid, has never been given due moral consideration. Jef-
ferson mentions exposure to two societies: the society of horse racers, card 
players, and fox hunters, and the society of scientific, professional, and dig-
nified men. He chose the latter. Yet his “choice” was not determined by 
deliberation. Jefferson early in life had the good fortune to be exposed to 
the company of a few men of high social and moral standing, and that made 
a large and lasting impression on him. Thus, he formed the “self-chate-
chising” habit of assuming their presence in difficult moral scenarios and 
of aiming to secure their approbation and avoid their disapprobation. Note 
both that the “jaundiced eye of youth” and a “process of moral reasoning” 
are each listed as impediments to right moral action. The choice essentially 
involved either being of worth to society and indifferent to self-indulgence 
or being self-indulgent and indifferent to social betterment.
Upshot
It is well known that Jefferson, in spite of his criticism of their shortcomings 
in his “Syllabus” and other pertinent writings, was mightily drawn to ancient 
moral treatises more than any other moral works. “I saw him more frequently 
with a volume of the classics in his hand than with any other book,” says be-
loved granddaughter Ellen Randolph Coolidge,49 and he valued the Classics 
chiefly, as he did the reading of history and even fiction, for its moral content. 
Again, when he passed away, his reading table had on it Aristotle’s Politics, 
one of Seneca’s moral works, and two French political treatises50—the first 
two are ancient works fraught with moral content. Having books by Aristotle 
and Seneca on his reading table attests to his enjoyment and the influence of 
eudemonism in Jefferson’s ethical thinking. Following ancient eudemonism, 
one would fully expect Jefferson at least to show a marked preference for a 
life lived virtuously over a life merely lived. That is what we find, for ex-
ample, in his 1808 letter to grandson Thomas Jefferson Randolph.
Nevertheless, several passages in Jefferson’s corpus of writings create 
a problem for that reading. They suggest that Jefferson is a sort of moral 
“survivalist”—that life, not the good life, is the first axiom of morality.
Scrutiny of such passages, however, show that the issue, for Jefferson, is 
not self-preservation, but self-preservation saluti populi. Jefferson argues 
49 Douglas L. Wilson, Jefferson’s Books (Charlottesville: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, 1996), 49.
50 Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson & the New Nation, 1008.
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for self-preservation saluti populi in dire scenarios to preserve human thriv-
ing by preserving the sort of state in which governors are public stewards, 
with limited terms, and citizens are morally sensitive agents that partici-
pate in political affairs, if only locally, to the fullest of their capacities. 
Acts of governors must preserve citizens’ rights. Thus, international acts 
of aggression, in which the normal moral relations between states are put 
in abeyancy, are given moral sanction not when the existence of any nation 
is at stake, but only when the existence of a law-abiding nation is at stake. 
Intranational acts of aggression, such as acts of revolution by citizens, must 
only be dictated, as Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson states, by “fla-
grant Necessity.”
From the Idea of Right … we must necessarily conclude, ‘that there can be no Right, or 
Limitation or Right, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good.’ And 
therefore in Cases of extreme Necessity, when the State cannot otherwise be preserv’d 
from Ruin, it must certainly be Just and Good in limited Governours, or in any other 
Persons who can do it, to use the Force of the State for its own preservation, beyond 
the Limits fix’d by the Constitution, in some transitory acts, which are not to be made 
Precedents. And on the other hand, when an equal Necessity to avoid Ruin requires it, 
the Subjects may justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg’d in their Governours, or may 
counteract them. This Privilege of flagrant Necessity, we all allow in defence of the most 
perfect private Rights: And if publick Rights are of more extensive Importance, so are 
also publick Necessitys. These necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise 
they can never over-balance the Evils of violating a tolerable Constitution, by an arbi-
trary act of Power, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No 
Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their important Rights are secur’d 
from the Cruelty, Avarice, Ambition, or Caprice of their Governours. Nor can any Mag-
istracy be safe, or effectual for the ends of its Institution, when there are frequent Terrors 
of Insurrections.51
Jefferson says much the same in his Summary View of the Rights of British 
America and Declaration of Independence.
Thus, Jefferson never argues that the right to life is the first axiom of eth-
ics. He argues for self-preservation saluti populi, not self-preservation per 
se. It follows that Jefferson is a eudemonist, not a moral survivalist.
51 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Fifth Edition (London, 
1753), 304-5.
